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When Are Independent Expenditures Not
Independent? Regulation of Campaign
Finance Entities After Citizens United
Francis Straub IV*
ABSTRACT
The recent growth in campaign spending has been accompanied by
rapid growth in the number and size of independent-expenditure
organizations, especially in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens United v. FEC. Whereas political committees
coordinate their actions with candidates, independent-expenditure
organizations, by definition, must carry on their activities without such
coordination. With its ruling that independent expenditures do not give
rise to concerns of quid pro quo corruption, the Court has placed these
expenditures almost entirely outside the realm of campaign finance
regulation that applies to political committees. Following Citizens
United, federal courts have made various attempts at applying this
principle to the organizations that make independent expenditures, with
inconsistent results.
This Comment reviews the modem history of campaign finance
jurisprudence to discern the rationale behind the Citizens United
decision. Recent Courts of Appeals' decisions are also examined to
determine how this rationale is and should be applied to independent-
expenditure organizations. Next, this Comment considers which
standard the courts should apply to determine whether independent-
expenditure organizations that are closely tied to political committees
should be outside the application of campaign finance laws, despite the
possibility of coordination with political candidates. To resolve this
question, this Comment proposes that the courts make use of a modified
application of the alter ego doctrine to decide such questions, as federal
courts already use this doctrine to determine when to treat two
*J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2016.
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purportedly separate organizations as a single entity when applying
federal law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the amount of money has increased in national election
campaigns, so too have the number and complexity of organizations
involved in campaign fundraising. There are two main types of non-
party political organizations: political committees, which may coordinate
expenditures with candidates for public office, and independent
expenditure organizations, which by definition act without direction from
any candidate.' Although these campaign finance entities are subject to
1. See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent
Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 684 (2012); Cf Stop This Insanity v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d
23, 37 (D.D.C. 2012)(discussing differences between committees that make independent
expenditures and those that do not); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 389 U.S. App. D.C. 424,
435, 599 F.3d 686, 697 (201 0)(noting differing regulations applied to political
committees and those making independent expenditures).
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different regulations, an increasing number of organizations are now
operating committees of both types concurrently.2 This concurrent
operation raises concerns about the autonomy of independent
expenditure organizations that work side-by-side with political
committees.3
In Part II, this Comment will examine modern judicial decisions
regarding campaign finance entities preceding, including, and following
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC.4 Through
this examination, a clear rift becomes apparent between federal circuit
courts in their treatment of related political committees and independent
expenditure organizations. This Comment will also examine federal
courts' treatment of closely-related entities to discern the relevant
standard that should be applied to closely-related campaign finance
organizations.
Part III of this Comment will discuss and weigh the divergent
approaches to this problem. This Comment will propose modifications
to existing federal doctrine for campaign finance entities, factors for
applying this doctrine, and presumptions to assist in courts' factual
analysis.
II. MODERN TRENDS IN THE TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES AND FEDERAL DOCTRINE REGARDING CLOSELY-
RELATED ENTITIES
Although this Comment focuses on the regulation of closely-related
campaign finance entities, a wide range of material must be examined to
provide the proper context for the discussion. Any analysis of campaign
finance, under either statutory or case law, requires that group
contributions and expenditures be considered when determining the
applicable standard for permissible conduct.5 A political committee
engaging in independent expenditures is largely free from the strictures
2. Cf David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between
Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 89
(1998)(examining growth in independent expenditures by political committees); Leading
Case, 115 HARv. L. REv. 416, 424 (2001)(discussing shift from direct contributions to
independent expenditures).
3. Cf Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 444 (5th Cir.
2014)(discussing difficulty in preventing quid pro quo corruption in hybrid organizations
which make both political contributions and independent expenditures).
4. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. Cf Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC), 758 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 190 L. Ed. 2d 830 (U.S. 2015)(stating that contributions and
expenditures are relevant to the definition of a political committee); Shays v. FEC, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2004)(discussing concerns of candidate coordination that
may arise with both contributions and expenditures).
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imposed upon total contributions from a single source; a political
committee that donates to or coordinates with a political candidate or
campaign is bound to adhere to the restrictions.6 Therefore, one must
look at an expenditure's character when made by an organization to
determine what limitations, if any, apply to contributions received by the
same.
7
A. Beginning of the Modern Era of Campaign Finance Law
The U.S. Supreme Court's first major foray into the modem
campaign finance realm came shortly after implementing the first
modem campaign finance law. The prompt challenge highlighted the
ever-present tension between efforts to limit the influence of money in
politics and individuals' and groups' desire to influence election
outcomes via financial expenditures. The Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 ("FECA"), 8 which was extensively amended in 1974,9 was
quickly challenged by several individuals and organizations that sought
to enjoin enforcement of the limitations on donations and expenditures
set forth in the amendments to FECA.10 This issue came before the
Court in Buckley v. Valeo,11 and the Court's decision in Buckley
continues to have a substantial influence on decisions involving
campaign finance.
12
In Buckley, the Court made a substantial effort to distinguish
between the extent of state interest necessary to uphold restrictions on
contributions and independent expenditures.13 Contributions are usually
made merely to show support for a candidate, but they may also be made
in exchange for political favors - a situation referred to as quid pro quo
corruption.14 Large contributions may be solicitations for quid pro quo
6. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
7. Cf id. at 345 (noting that uncoordinated expenditures do not give rise to quid pro
quo corruption concerns that would be a legitimate state interest in regulation); Wis.
Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (WRTL), 664 F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 201 1)(stating
that coordinated expenditures would disqualify committee for independent expenditure
safe-harbor).
8. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2012)).
9. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2012)).
10. Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 137 (D.D.C. 1975).
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); WRTL, 664 F.3d 139; VRLC, 758 F.3d 118.
13. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
14. Quid pro quo corruption arises when a candidate or officeholder obtains
contributions, usually substantial in nature, from a donor, in order to secure for the donor
a quid pro quo consideration from the candidate or officeholder while acting as a public
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considerations from political office holders or candidates; even the
potential for such arrangements gives rise to a legitimate state interest in
forestalling any such action. 15
Nonetheless, the Buckley court determined that limits on
independent expenditures "fail to serve any substantial government
interest" due to "the absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent... ,,16 From this decision
came the fundamental distinction that has been a common theme of
subsequent jurisprudence:17 while both implicate First Amendment
concerns, "expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association
than do... limitations on financial contributions."'8
Contribution limit analysis involves weighing interests involved in
both contributions and expenditures. The basic expression served by a
contribution, a show of financial support, can be communicated through
contributions of varying amounts. Small or large contributions can serve
to provide a general indication of support for a candidate, but a donor can
indicate support regardless of a donation's size.'9  Conversely, a
limitation on expenditures may completely exclude certain forms of
expression, such as costly television advertising campaigns, thereby
creating a restraint on the types of expression in which a person or
organization can legally engage.2° As the majority in Buckley wryly
noted, "[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to
a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far
and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.'
The Buckley Court also attempted to clearly define the term
"political committee" in campaign finance laws such as FECA.22
Attempting to limit the organizations that would be subject to such laws,
the Court embraced the concept that only organizations "that are under
the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate" are properly considered political
committees.2 3 This test was adopted by later courts, which gave
representative. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. In order to implicate quid pro quo
corruption concerns, the questioned donation must be "a direct exchange of an official act
for money." McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1489 (2014).
15. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
16. Id. at 47.
17. See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011).
18. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
19. Id. at 20-21.
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Id. at 19n.18.
22. Id. at 79.
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
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considerable weight o the article "the" preceding the phrase "major
purpose" when determining whether to treat an organization as a political
committee.24
The Court further clarified its position regarding limitations on
corporate speech in First National Bank v. Bellotti.25 In a challenge to a
Massachusetts statute that forbade expenditures by corporate actors to
influence voting on referendums,26 the Court maintained that speech
otherwise protected under the First Amendment could not be limited due
to the speaker's corporate identity.27 The Court noted that, although
preventing corruption, or the risk thereof, was a significant concern in
other cases involving restrictions on expenditures, it was not at issue in a
referendum.28 This affirmed the principle the Court established in
Buckley: quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance of such, would be
the most sustainable ground for the Court to uphold government
restrictions on political contributions.
29
Later courts' jurisprudence generally hewed to the principles
established in Buckley, and courts continue to apply these principles
today.3° One such case, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake
("NCRL JJJ"),31 involved applying a North Carolina statute that imposed
contribution limits on certain donations made to a political
organization.12  The organization engaged in direct candidate
contributions and also operated two subsidiary committees, one of which
engaged in only independent expenditures.33 The court relied on precise
Buckley language, finding that only an organization with "'the major
purpose' of supporting or opposing a candidate [is] to be considered a
political committee.34 By narrowly construing the language of Buckley,
24. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 n.6 (1986); N.C.
Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL 111), 525 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 2008).
25. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
26. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977).
27. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.
28. Id. at 790.
29. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
30. See Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (WRTL), 664 F.3d 139, 152 (7th
Cir. 201 1)(discussing Buckley's use of quid pro quo corruption as a legitimate state
interest in regulating political contributions); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell
(VRLC), 758 F.3d 118, 133 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 190 L. Ed. 2d 830 (U.S.
2015)(noting the appropriate standard of review as established in Buckley); See generally
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)(applying rationale and holdings from
Buckley extensively).
31. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL II1), 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
32. Id. at 277-78.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 288.
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the court concluded that Buckley principles did not apply where an
organization had candidate support as one of several major purposes.35
The Fourth Circuit also relied on Buckley in determining that
preventing quid pro quo corruption is the only sufficiently important
state interest to support restrictions on political contributions.36 Relying
on this foundation, the NCRL III court concluded that independent
expenditures, which are made separate from and without the intervention
of a candidate or campaign, were unlikely to implicate concerns over
quid pro quo corruption due to the lack of candidate involvement in the
transaction.37 The rationale employed by the Fourth Circuit to exempt
independent expenditures and the relevant organizations from campaign
finance restrictions presaged the U.S. Supreme Court's similar reasoning
in a case taken up just a few years later.
B. Citizens United- Reaffirming the Buckley Standard of Corruption
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely addressed the
independent expenditure issue in Citizens United v. FEC.38 In Citizens
United, a nonprofit corporation challenged a federal statute that barred it
from airing a video to urge viewers not to vote for then-Senator Hillary
Clinton in the upcoming presidential primary election.39 Relying on its
ruling in Bellotti, the Court "rejected the argument that political speech
of corporations or other associations should be treated differently" from
the speech of individuals or other speakers in analyzing First
Amendment challenges to speech restrictions.40
In its holding, the Court relied substantially on the Buckley ruling in
distinguishing actions that could give rise to quid pro quo corruption, or
the appearance thereof, from independent expenditures, which lacked the
"prearrangement and coordination" necessary to implicate quid pro quo
corruption concerns.41  Although the Buckley court stated that only
independent expenditures "alleviate[] the danger" of quid pro quo
corruption,42 here the Court determined that, on the facts as applied to the
35. Id.
36. NCRL IM, 525 F.3d at 291-92.
37. Id. at 292.
38. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
39. Id. at 319-21.
40. Id. at 343.
41. Id. at 345 (noting that contributions were distinguishable from independent
expenditures in that independent expenditures lacked the coordination with a candidate
that would be necessary to give rise to quid pro quo corruption); id. at 357 (quoting
language from Buckley that the lack of coordination with candidates and campaigns
reduces the danger that independent expenditures would give rise to quid pro quo
corruption).
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
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statute in question, "[l]imits on expenditures... have a chilling effect
extending well beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro
quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace
the speech here in question.43 In addition, the Court extended the
Bellotti court's logic to strike a ban on independent expenditures made
by corporations to support candidates.4
Nonetheless, the Court in Citizens United distinguished between
contribution limits, "which ... have been an accepted means to prevent
quidpro quo corruption," and limits on independent expenditures.45 The
majority also noted that the government interest in preventing quid pro
quo corruption was sufficient when limiting direct contributions to
political committees.6 The Court further noted that Citizens United had
not directly contributed money to candidates and that contribution limits
were not within the case's scope.7
Nonetheless, other courts have extended the Citizens United ruling
to strike down contribution limits on donations made to independent
expenditure organizations.4  Such courts support their decisions with
language from Citizens United, stating that "independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or
the appearance of corruption.,49 However, this oft-quoted excerpt omits
the sentence's beginning- "[f]or the reasons explained above" - which
makes it clear that the Court relies on "the absence of prearrangement
and coordination" in making this determination.50  This omission has
resulted in subsequent jurisprudence that applies the language of Citizens
United too broadly in some cases and is likely the primary source of
courts' divergent views on campaign contribution limits' application to
allegedly independent expenditure organizations.
C. The Split in Authority Over Applying Contribution Limits to
Independent expenditure Organizations
Following the Court's ruling in Citizens United, a seemingly
endless procession of challenges to campaign finance laws continues
43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
44. Id. at 347.
45. Id. at 359 (italics in original).
46. Id. at 345.
47. Id. at 359.
48. See generally Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (WRTL), 664 F.3d 139
(7th Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011);
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
49. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
50. Id.
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with a predictable regularity. One such challenge, Wisconsin Right to
Life State PAC v. Barland ("WRTL"),51 arose in the Seventh Circuit over
a state statute limiting yearly aggregate contributions to political
committees and independent expenditure organizations.2 The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that federal courts have long distinguished
between contributions and expenditures when determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to constitutional challenges of
campaign finance laws.53 The court considered the recent decision in
Citizens United and determined that there was no state interest sufficient
to uphold a restriction on independent expenditures.4 From this, the
court held that contributions to independent expenditure organizations
must be free from statutorily-defined contribution limits based on the
principle that independent expenditures could not be subject to
limitation 5
This finding was not, however, made without restriction. Although
the argument that he mere possibility of the appearance of corruption
could serve as grounds for expenditure regulation was firmly settled by
the decision in Citizens United, the Seventh Circuit allowed for a
situation where otherwise independent expenditures could fall within the
scope of regulated activity.56 The court in WRTL noted that, where an
allegedly independent committee coordinates its activities with a
candidate, such activities would not be considered independent and,
therefore, would not be exempted from regulations applicable to
political committees.7
The Ninth Circuit weighed similar considerations in Thalheimer v.
City of San Diego.8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Citizens United, by
limiting the permissible justification for regulating campaign finance
entities to the existence or appearance of quid pro quo corruption, had
excluded previous considerations of access to or influence over elected
officials as grounds for permitted regulation.5 9 Also stopping short of
exempting all purportedly independent organizations from regulation, the
court noted that, where "regulated entities had unusually close
relationships with the candidates they supported," the interest in
51. Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (WRTL), 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011).
52. Id. at 144.
53. Id. at 152-53 (discussing distinction between intermediate scrutiny as applied to
contributions and strict scrutiny as applied to expenditures).
54. Id at 153.
55. Id. at 154.
56. WRTL, 664 F.3d at 155.
57. Id.
58. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011).
59. Id. at 1119 (stating that Citizens United stands for the proposition that
independent expenditures do not give rise to quid pro quo corruption as a matter of law).
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preventing corruption could be sufficient to justify regulation regardless
of the entity's designation.60
At least one other court has confronted this issue and concluded that
the actions of independent expenditure organizations can never give rise
to the possibility of quid pro quo corruption.6 However, this position is
not a universally held view. The Second Circuit's recent decision in
Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell ("VRL C")62 takes a
closer look at independence in purportedly-independent expenditure
organizations.
The controversy in VRLC concerned applying reporting
requirements and contribution limits under Vermont law to the Vermont
Right to Life Committee-Fund for Independent Expenditures ("VRLC-
FIPE").63 VRLC-FTPE was wholly controlled by Vermont Right to Life
Committee, Inc., which also controlled Vermont Right to Life
Committee, Inc. Political Committee ("VRLC-PC"). 64  The Second
Circuit acknowledged that other jurisdictions do not subject independent
expenditure organizations to contribution limits, due to the lack of quid
pro quo corruption or the possibility thereof in such organizations.65
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, stating that
"VRLC-FIPE is enmeshed financially and organizationally with VRLC-
PC, a PAC that makes direct contributions to candidates.'66  Given
VRLC-FIPE's close ties to an organization that implicates quid pro quo
corruption concerns, the court reasoned that VRLC-FIPE's independence
could not be determined by the bare declaration that it was an
independent expenditure organization.67
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit considered two
factors that courts in other jurisdictions analyzed to determine that
independent expenditure organizations could not be subject to
contribution limitations.68  First, the court examined the practice of
60. Id. at 1121.
61. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The D.C. Circuit stated:
In light of the Court's holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do
not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of
corruption. The Court has effectively held that there is no corrupting 'quid' for which a
candidate might in exchange offer a corrupt 'quo.'
Id. at 694-95.
62. Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC), 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 190 L. Ed. 2d 830 (U.S. 2015).
63. Id. at 121.
64. Id. at 143.
65. Id. at 140.
66. Id. at 141.
67. VRLC, 758 F.3d at 145.
68. Id. at 141-42.
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maintaining separate bank accounts to show the existence of an
independent organization, which was sufficient for the D.C. Circuit to
characterize certain funds as independent expenditure accounts free from
the taint of quid pro quo corruption.69 However, the court reasoned that
maintaining separate bank accounts alone was not sufficient factual
evidence to demonstrate that the alleged independent expenditure
organization did not coordinate its expenditures with a candidate or
organization.70
Second, the court looked to the committee separation set forth by
the groups' organizational documents, which the Fourth Circuit used to
determine that two organizations were separate as a matter of law.7'
Here, the Second Circuit flatly disagreed with the notion that a separation
by paperwork was sufficient to alleviate potential concerns of quid pro
72quo corruption.
Determining "whether a group is functionally distinct from a non-
independent-expenditure-only entity" is dependent "on factors such as
the overlap of staff and resources, the lack of financial independence, the
coordination of activities, and the flow of information between the
entities.73 The court considered the availability and flow of information
between independent and non-independent expenditure organizations as
a factor in determining the actual independence of a purported
independent expenditure organization.74 In finding that VRLC-FIPE and
VRLC-PC had transferred funds between organizations, shared
substantial personnel between the two groups, and acted in concert in
publishing voter guides, the court held that Vermont's contribution limits
could properly be applied to VRLC-FIPE.75
Although a majority of the circuit courts that have considered the
issue granted independent expenditure organizations broad exclusions
from contribution limits, 76 the Second Circuit's analysis appears to more
closely hew to the U.S. Supreme Court's stated rationale in Citizens
United.77 Rather than looking only to the description of an entity's
expenditures as independent, the Second Circuit properly examined the
69. See generally Emily's List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
70. VRLC, 758 F.3d at 141; accord Ala. Democratic Conf. v. Ala. Att'y Gen., 541 F.
App'x 931,936 (11th Cir. 2013).
71. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL I1), 525 F.3d 274, 294 n.8 (4th Cir.
2008).
72. VRLC, 758 F.3d at 141-42.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 142.
75. Id. at 143-45.
76. See generally Emily's List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Wis. Right to
Life State PAC v. Barland (WRTL), 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011); NCRL 11, 525 F.3d
274; Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011).
77. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
organization's nature to determine whether its contributions and
expenditures were truly made absent "prearrangement and coordination"
with a candidate.78 In order to accurately characterize an organization's
nature, courts will need to determine whether the organization is
independent from the control of both candidates and organizations that
operate in tandem with candidates.
D. The Alter Ego Doctrine in Federal Common Law
Although the distinction between political committees and
independent expenditure organizations is an issue that courts have
addressed, it has been approached with varying analyses and iffering
outcomes.79 Even courts that have ruled that independent expenditure
organizations cannot give rise to even the possibility of quid pro quo
corruption have largely qualified their positions regarding situations
where some degree of coordination occurred between a candidate and an
avowed independent expenditure organization.8" Given the disparate
approaches to analyzing issues of separation between political
committees and independent expenditure organizations, it likely will be
helpful for courts to look to existing jurisprudence for guidance in
determining how to distinguish between arrangements involving two
independent entities and those involving multiple actors working in
concert.
Federal common law already possesses such a test to determine
when two entities, while apparently separate, should be treated as a
single entity in matters before the courts. Federal courts have utilized the
alter ego doctrine to resolve not only the imposition of financial liability
among a corporation and its owners,81 but also to determine when
multiple corporations should be treated as a single indistinct entity when
applying federal law.82 The alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine,
applied by courts to promote justice based on particular factual
circumstances.83 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that otherwise-
78. VRLC, 758 F.3d at 141-42.
79. See generally WRTL, 664 F.3d 139; VRTL, 758 F.3d 118; Thalheimer, 645 F.3d
at 1121.
80. See WRTL, 664 F.3d at 155; Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1121.
8 1. See generally Trs. of the Nat'l Elevator Indus. Pension, Health Benefit & Educ.
Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2003); Talen's Landing, Inc. v. M/V Venture, II,
656 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. See NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579 (6th Cir.
1986)(discussing the application of alter ego liability under the National Labor Relations
Act).
83. See, e.g., Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1019, 1021 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983)(noting that
"[i]n corporate law, as in the labor field, the alter ego doctrine is an equitable principle
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respected legal forms may be disregarded where "to do so would work
fraud or injustice. 84 The alter ego doctrine is a method by which courts
can ensure that the legal forms of organization are not subverted to
accomplish a goal incompatible with established law.
85
Determining whether one organization operates functionally as "the
alter ego of [a company] is a question of fact.,86 As such, a court must
engage in a factual inquiry to determine if an alter ego situation exists
between multiple entities.87 Some courts include intent to evade the
proper application of law as a part of their alter ego analysis,88 but nearly
all alter ego considerations look to factors such as "substantially identical
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers,
supervision, and ownership.89  Although not all of these factors are
directly transferrable to the association between political committees and
independent expenditure organizations, analogous relationships can be
made to the existing factors for alter ego treatment.
The alter ego doctrine's framework originally evolved from state
common law and has become a part of federal common law as courts
have interpreted the proper federal statutory law application.90 Federal
courts have applied the doctrine in various factual situations as required
to ensure equity where recognition of legal formalities would defeat the
intent of the public policy driving the law.9' One such example can be
found in Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board.92 In Goodman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
the test for alter ego consideration was "flexible" and relied on the
"substantially identical management, supervision, customers, ownership,
and business purpose" of the corporations to determine that the alter ego
doctrine was properly applied by the lower court.93 Demonstrating the
designed to prevent an entity from doing injury and then escaping
responsibility")(emphasis omitted).
84. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 324 (1939).
85. Cf Eichleay Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, & Ornamental Workers,
944 F.2d 1047, 1059 (3d Cir. 1991); Bd. ofTrs. v. Universal Enters., Inc., 751 F.2d 1177,
1184 (1 lth Cir. 1985); CMSH Co. v. Carpenters Trust Fund, 963 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir.
1992).
86. Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984).
87. See Flynn v. R.C. Tile, 353 F.3d 953, 962 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579-82 (6th Cir.
1986)(discussing whether unlawful intent was a necessary factor in the application of the
alter ego doctrine).
89. Goodman Piping, 741 F.2d at 12.
90. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage, Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 336-37
(6th Cir. 1990)(discussing the application of the alter ego doctrine under various
standards).
91. See Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 150 (1st Cir. 2003).
92. Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984).
93. See id. at 12.
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alter ego doctrine's utility in multiple areas of law, this case resolved an
appeal from an administrative law judge's decision involving the
National Labor Relations Board's imposition of liability on a successor
corporation under a collective bargaining agreement.
94
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit relied on the alter ego doctrine in
Flynn v. R.C. Tile95 to resolve a pension contribution matter under a
collective bargaining agreement.96  The court determined that several
successor corporations were subject to the same obligations that had
bound the initial corporation because the businesses were operated
within the same area, under the same management, and for the same
purpose.97 The D.C. Circuit further noted that the corporations did not
observe the necessary formalities in transactions between the entities,
additionally supporting the conclusion that the corporations were not
distinct and separate entities.98
It is important to note that the alter ego doctrine may be applied
differently depending on the particular case's circumstances. In federal
labor law issues, the alter ego doctrine concerns businesses that attempt
to avoid their collective bargaining obligations or disguise their
continued operations.99 Comparatively, in corporate law issues, the alter
ego doctrine concerns one corporation dominating another or an attempt
to effectuate a fraud or other wrong.100 This Comment, however, is
primarily concerned with the alter ego doctrine as evolved from its use in
federal labor law, as the related entities in question may attempt to avoid
obligations under both federal and state law.'01 It should also be noted
that either the control exercised over an independent expenditure
organization by a closely-related political committee or the attempt to
circumvent the intent of campaign finance laws that may be present
between the campaign finance entities addressed herein would likely
satisfy the alter ego test as applied in the corporate law context."2
94. See id. at 11.
95. Flynn v. R.C. Tile, 353 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir 2004).
96. See generally id.
97. See id. at 958-60.
98. See id. at 960.
99. See Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Superior Gen. Contractors,
104 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1997).
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Mass. Carpenters Cent. Collection Agency v. Belmont Concrete
Corp., 139 F.3d 304, 307 (1st Cir. 1998)(discussing that the alter ego doctrine is used "to
prevent employers from evading their obligations under" federal law and "applies to
situations where the companies are parallel companies").
102. See, e.g., Wolfe v. United States, 798 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir.
1986)(discussing factors of corporate alter ego doctrine in application of Montana law
where an individual controlled all aspects of corporation and was treated as the alter ego
of the corporation).
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III. THE PROBLEM OF CLOSELY-RELATED CAMPAIGN FINANCE
ENTITIES AND A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The line of demarcation between political committees and
independent expenditure organizations is sometimes difficult to draw
precisely. When entities grow and expand, their power over the political
process increases steadily.103 It is therefore important not only for the
federal legislature to draft necessary laws to ensure that these actors play
fairly in the political sandbox, but also for the federal judiciary to have
and apply these laws in a predictable and consistent manner. The
divergent approaches currently used by various circuit courts'04 are
clearly insufficient to ensure that all political organizations will be
treated equally under federal law.
Applying the alter ego doctrine to cases where actual separation
between political committees and independent expenditure organizations
comes into question will create the predictability necessary in future
jurisprudence involving campaign finance laws. This test is already
widely used by federal courts,10 5 and its extension into the campaign
finance realm would require little adjustment to current analytical
standards. Using this test would provide courts with a consistent and
familiar standard to apply in situations involving these entities.
With the high level of sophistication now present in many campaign
finance entities, a thorough inquiry into the facts and circumstances of
each case could become overwhelming for the courts if a significant
amount of challenges to the application of campaign finance laws were
filed by these entities. In order to aid the courts in their analyses and to
provide reasonable predictability to campaign finance entities, some
presumptions regarding interactions between political committees and
independent expenditure organizations should be established. Where the
courts' administrative efficiency will be improved, it is acceptable to
establish guidelines that provide courts with a framework of assumptions
from which to begin their analysis.
0 6
To provide clarity for political organizations, several presumptions
regarding activity between political committees and independent
103. See Cromer v. South Carolina, 917 F.2d 819, 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
104. See supra Part II.C. For additional discussion of the varying approaches taken
by courts addressing contribution limits in the modem era, see James Bopp, Jr., Randy
Elf, & Anita Y. Milanovich, Contribution Limits After McCutcheon v. FEC, 49 VAL. U.
L. REv. 361 (2015).
105. See Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir.
1984); Flynn v. R.C. Tile, 353 F.3d 953, 958-60 (D.C. Cir 2004); NLRB v. Allcoast
Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1986).
106. Cf FEC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430
(1 990)(discussing the use of per se rules in antitrust regulation).
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expenditure organizations would be useful in order to allow these
organizations to avoid creating an inappropriate nexus of activity that
may create unwanted liability. By using the alter ego doctrine as the
basis for these considerations, the presumptions can be modeled in such a
way as to delineate those circumstances in which campaign finance
entities should proceed with caution and evaluate alternative methods of
operation. In this, independent expenditure organizations would less
likely raise the quid pro quo corruption specter and avoid any questions
about the propriety of their operations.
A. Difficulties With Current Approaches to the Treatment of Related
Political Committees and Independent Expenditure Organizations
Some circuit courts' current treatment of independent expenditure
organizations after Citizens United is fairly straightforward. Several
circuits have approached the issue in the same manner as the D.C. Circuit
in SpeechNow.org v. FEC)0 7 In SpeechNow, the D.C. Circuit considered
contributions to an independent expenditure organization.10 8 Following
minimal consideration, the court concluded that "[i]n light of the Court's
holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt
or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to
groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or
create the appearance of corruption."10 9
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit noted that "as a categorical matter,"
independent expenditures cannot be tied to quid pro quo corruption.1 °
From this, the court quickly concluded that contributions to an
independent expenditure organization were entitled to the same
deference."'1  Although the Seventh Circuit noted that where an
"independent committee is not truly independent" it would not be
entitled to exclusion from contribution limits, the court did not inquire
into whether the expenditures in question were "truly independent."',
12
The Second Circuit in Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v.
Sorrell took a more nuanced approach to the question, looking to the
interrelated activities of a political committee and an allegedly-
independent expenditure organization.13 After noting that the entities
107. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
108. Id. at 690.
109. Id. at 694 (relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United).




113. See generally Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC), 758 F.3d 118
(2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 190 L. Ed. 2d 830 (U.S. 2015).
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shared organization, advocacy, and fundraising activities, the court
concluded that the independent expenditure organization was not acting
truly independently, and there, was subject to the contribution limits that
applied to political committees.1 14  Although the Second Circuit
reasonably considered the particularized facts in its analysis, its
conclusion is clearly at odds with the weight of authority, which views
the language of Citizens United in a more simplified manner. 11
5
Despite the obvious administrative efficiency, it seems
disingenuous to exempt all political organizations that label themselves
as independent expenditure organizations from the campaign finance
laws applicable to other entities. Such a practice is also not in line with
Citizens United's plain language, which noted that truly independent
expenditures did not give rise to quid pro quo corruption due to a lack of
coordination with a candidate."6 Where facts suggest a potential for
candidate coordination exists, Citizens United's rationale appears to
indicate that such coordinated activity may be within the campaign
finance regulation's scope. It falls to the courts to determine the nature
of the inquiry into any such situation.
B. Application of the Alter Ego Doctrine to Political Committees and
Independent Expenditure Organizations
Although there is currently no bright-line test to distinguish when a
political committee and an independent expenditure organization are
functionally indistinct, courts often engage in analysis where two
purportedly separate entities may be treated as a single actor. The "alter
ego" doctrine provides that two entities may be treated as a single unit
where there is substantial overlap in their "management, business
purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and
ownership."',17 Where one entity's actions serve to avoid another related
entity's obligations, courts may treat the two entities as a single actor in
order to determine where the obligations should properly lie.' 18 The
same logic would apply to a situation where donations are directed to an
independent expenditure organization as a means of circumventing the
contribution limits that would apply to a situation where donations were
made to a political committee.1 9
114. Id. at 145.
115. Compare id. at 20, with SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.
2010); WRTL, 664 F.3d 139; Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2011).
116. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
117. Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984).
118. See Flynn v. R.C. Tile, 353 F.3d 953, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
119. See VRLC, 758 F.3d at 145.
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Although plainly applying the alter ego doctrine to all political
organizations would likely be unhelpful, the doctrine can serve as a
framework for establishing how to determine when two organizations are
functionally distinct. Several factors used in the alter ego doctrine are
directly relevant to political organizations, including management,
operation, supervision, and ownership.120 However, courts would need
to look to donors, contributions, and candidates supported, rather than
customers and equipment, as factors to consider when determining
whether political organizations acted as a single entity.21 Consideration
of these factors can be accomplished via several methods-this
Comment presents one possible framework to aid courts in their analysis.
1. Analyzing Financial Separation Among Multiple Organizations
Separation of funds between a political committee and an
independent expenditure organization is a vital factor in determining
whether the two organizations are truly independent.122 As the sine qua
non of an independent expenditure organization is the dissociation of its
expenditures from coordination with a candidate, it is clear that
commingling funds between a political committee, which interacts and
coordinates expenditures with a candidate, and an independent
expenditure organization raises a legitimate concern that the commingled
funds will be used for coordinated expenditures or direct contributions to
candidates.123  To assure that political funds are used for legitimate
purposes, "strict segregation of its monies" must be observed where an
independent expenditure organization deals with a political committee in
a substantial capacity. 124
Where two organizations jointly engage in fundraising activities, the
possibility arises that contributions may be solicited on behalf of the
independent expenditure organization as a method of circumventing
contribution limits applicable to political committees.125  The U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that circumventing the contribution limits
imposed on political committees raises the same quid pro quo corruption
concerns as direct contributions to the same committees.126 As the D.C.
Circuit stated, "it is hard to understand how a donor, approached by the
120. See supra Part II.D at 24-25.
121. See supra Part II.D at 25.
122. Stop This Insanity v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 43 (D.D.C. 2012).
123. See VRLC, 758 F.3d at 145.
124. See Pipefitters Local Union v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414 (1972).
125. See McConnell v FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 125 (2003), rev'd on other grounds,
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
126. See generally FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431
(2001); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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same fundraiser on behalf of both [PACs], could not believe that his or
her contributions would be linked."'2 7
In order to prevent fund intermingling, two presumptions should
apply to fundraising activities conducted by independent expenditure
organizations. First, a presumption of fund intermingling should be
made where political committee fundraisers solicit donations for an
independent expenditure organization. This would alleviate the concern
that donations may be funneled to an independent expenditure
organization as a means of circumventing campaign contribution limits
by directing donations exceeding these limits to organizations known to
support the same candidates or causes that are advanced by the political
committee. 1
28
Second, a political committee presumably intermingles funds with
an independent expenditure organization where donors to the political
committee are encouraged to make contributions to an independent
expenditure organization for the clear purpose of supporting the same
cause or candidate supported by the political committee. While not as
pernicious as directly soliciting contributions for the independent
expenditure organization, such actions by a political committee may also
raise quid pro quo corruption concerns by creating an association
between a donor's support of a certain candidate and the donor's
contribution to an independent expenditure organization.129 Although
this presumption might implicate situations where no actual link exists
between the political committee and the independent expenditure
organization, any action brought against a political committee could be
swiftly dismissed on a showing that the two organizations share no
accounts, personnel, or other common elements.
2. Analyzing Separation of Personnel Between Multiple
Organizations
A separation of personnel between similar political committees and
independent expenditure organizations is desirable, but may not always
be practical due to some organizations' limited resources. 130
Nonetheless, a significant personnel overlap between the two
127. Stop This Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
128. See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
129. Cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (stating concerns of apparent quid pro quo
corruption where opportunities for abuse existed); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. at 454-55 (noting that candidate can coordinate with donor to direct
donations to certain organizations).
130. See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC), 758 F.3d 118, 145 (2d Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 190 L. Ed. 2d 830 (U.S. 2015).
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organizations creates difficulties for a court to determine the extent to
which the actual operations of the two organizations are enmeshed with
one another."' In order to provide clarity to both courts and political
organizations, clear guidelines should be established as to the duties and
responsibilities that one or more persons may hold in related political
committees and independent expenditure organizations.
A vital factor in determining a purportedly independent expenditure
organization's actual degree of independence is the separation of its
expenditure decisions from any "prearrange[ment] or coordinat[ion] with
the candidate."132  An organization's expenditure decisions must be
completely dissociated from a candidate to properly be considered
"political speech that is not coordinated with a candidate."'133 Where the
expenditures of an independent expenditure organization are coordinated
with those of a political committee, it is clear that the two organizations'
activities are not functionally distinct.134 The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that "coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions"'
and that coordinated expenditures can be limited when necessary to
ensure that contribution limits are respected.
36
To alleviate the quid pro quo corruption concerns that arise with
coordinated expenditures,137 it would be desirable to have separate
individuals or entities in charge of expenditure decisions for closely
associated political committees and independent expenditure
organizations. Without such separation, it is eminently possible that the
two entities' shared management will not show proper respect to the
necessary separation between the organizations.138 Given this potential
for quid pro quo corruption, courts should presume that a political
committee and an independent expenditure organization operate as a
single entity subject to the contribution limits applicable to political
committees where one or more persons or entities occupies a position
responsible for making expenditure decisions for both organizations.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the quid pro
quo corruption risk is attenuated when money passes from a donor to a
candidate by way of a third party, such as a political committee, the
Court also notes that the risk still exists where such donations are
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 485 (2010).
134. VRLC, 758 F.3d at 144.
135. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976).
136. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001).
137. Seeid. at446.
138. See VRLC, 758 F.3d at 143-44.
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"directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder."'139 Absent
other considerations, the burden of proof should rest with "the party with
easier access to relevant information.' 140 Where one person or entity
controls both candidate-connected funds and independent expenditures,
the burden should rest on that party to show sufficient facts to
demonstrate that there is no quid pro quo corruption in the arrangement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Campaign finance law is an issue hotly contested by all parties
affected. Courts have attempted to balance the public's interest in
preventing corruption with the interests of those who wish to engage in
political speech. While courts have generally been able to navigate these
often-competing interests fairly, recent trends following Citizens United
are troubling. If courts exempt organizations from campaign finance
laws by an analysis no deeper than looking at the organization's
designation, there will likely be an increasing amount of abuse by groups
labeling themselves as independent expenditure organizations.
In order to limit potential abuse, it is both reasonable and
advantageous for courts to adopt clear guidelines for permissible
behavior by independent expenditure organizations, especially where
they are closely related to political committees. This will benefit actors
wishing to engage in political speech by allowing them to determine
what activities raise quid pro quo corruption concerns without a costly
court battle. Although no solution will mollify all parties, the guidelines
suggested by this Comment are one example of reasonable boundaries
that keep entities from coordinating with candidates either intentionally
or accidentally. By avoiding such coordination, independent expenditure
organizations, even those closely affiliated with a political committee,
may remain firmly within safe-harbor protections for independent
speech.
139. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014)(quoting McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003)).
140. See, e.g., Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir.
2001).

